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Abstract
This article provides an original exploration of the self-identified populist coalition
leading the Italian government between 2018 and 2019. The analysis, informed by a
governmentality approach, starts by scrutinising the economic, social, and cultural
issues framed as political “problems” by the coalition, also highlighting the tensions
underlying such constructions. The second step charts how this political subject sought
to address those problems by deploying an array of political technologies. From
examining these two dimensions, the article then can discern the composite rationali-
ty—techno-sovereignism—that drove precariously the coalition’s art of government.
Finally, the article sketches out some forms of contestation against the techno-
sovereignist operations, whose significance may stretch beyond the Italian borders.
Overall, although the Italian populist coalition turned out to be ephemeral, the dynam-
ics that characterized its emergence and functioning could still be used heuristically to
understand the interactions and reciprocal adjustments possibly used by right-wing and
technocratic populist groups to exert political power conjointly.
Keywords Five StarMovement . Governmentality . Italy . Mythological machine .
Populism . The League
The coalition leading the Italian government between 2018 and 2019 explicitly self-
identified as “populist” (Il Sole 24Ore, June 5, 2018). This was an unprecedented case
in the Italian post-war history (Zulianello 2020). The invocation of a populist identity
seemed to warrant a degree of coherence to the Yellow-Green1 alliance otherwise split
between two political forces—the “Five Star Movement” (5SM) and “The League”—
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marked by different (and to some extent contradictory) histories claims and visions.
This article charts the “governmentality” of the Yellow-Green coalition, that is, the
tangle of epistemic, affective and mythological processes by which such a fluid
political subject secured its existence framing a number of issues as political emergen-
cies to be tackled by supposedly distinctive strategies (Rose and Miller 1992)
Although the Yellow-Green case has been the target of a sustained scholarly scrutiny
(e.g., McDonnell and Vampa 2016; Engesser et al. 2017; Funke and Trebesch 2017;
Mosca and Tronconi 2019), an analysis of its governmentality has not been outlined
thus far. Yet this operation would be significant, for two interlinked reasons. The first is
analytical: it could provide insights into how the Italian populist assemblage rational-
ized its genetic tensions translating them into relatively coherent political programs
(Rose 2017). This has the potential to shed light on some constitutive dynamics,
functioning diagrams and implicit frictions characterising other “new” populist alli-
ances, and namely those characterized by a combination of right-wing and technocratic
populist elements (Caramani 2017; Jansen 2017; Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti
2018; De Blasio and Sorice 2018). The second reason is normative and strategic:
drawing out the Yellow-Green governmentality could help identify new targets for
progressive anti-authoritarian political contestation, pointing to forms of critical disen-
tanglement from the populist reach.
Background
Coalition’s history
The 5SM was founded in 2009 by a comedian (Beppe Grillo) and a web strategist
(Gianroberto Casaleggio). The movement was characterized since its inception by a
searing anti-establishment stance and a strong support for digital politics as well as
direct democracy, re-moralization of politics, international humanitarianism, and envi-
ronmentalism (Mosca and Tronconi 2019). The Northern League is a much older
political subject. It was established in 1991 as a federation of regional parties of
northern and north-central Italy, by Umberto Bossi (McDonnell and Vampa 2016).
In 2013, Matteo Salvini defeated Bossi in a leadership election, rebranding the party as
“La Lega” [The League] and reducing its original regionalist-federalist emphasis,
whilst embracing nationalism, Euroscepticism and opposition to external immigration.
In spite of the resonance with libertarian and right-wing/conservative motives respec-
tively, both 5SM and The League’s leaders have always distanced themselves from the
left–right paradigm, deemed as old and inaccurate (Caramani 2017).
In the 2018 general election, the 5SM was the largest Italian party whilst The League
ranked third behind the Democratic Party. In May 2018, after three months of nego-
tiations, the 5SM and The League struck a deal—formalized as a “Contract for
the Government of Change”—on a common platform to bring a new government to
Italy. They chose as premier a law professor, Giuseppe Conte, whose role was to
“enforce” the Contract. The two parties’ leaders—Matteo Salvini and Luigi Di
Maio—held respectively the Home Office and the Labour Ministry apical
offices as well as the shared deputy premier’s seat. In August 2019, The
League announced a motion of no confidence against Conte, who then
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resigned. This triggered a political reshuffle that resulted in The League pulling
off the government, replaced by the Democratic Party, with, once again, Conte
as prime minister, and therefore the end of the Yellow-Green experience.
Research context
Although this political conjuncture turned out to be ephemeral, it can still be used to
generate insights into how other “new” populist coalitions—namely those that
combine authoritarian right-wing and technocratic populism (cf. Zulianello
2020)–may stabilize their internal tensions in order to exert institutional power,
and more broadly to allow an understanding of how such assemblages “think”
and exert power (Foucault 1995, p. 201).
Therefore, the originality and significance of this paper should be situated with
respect to the emerging literature on the intersections between contemporary right-wing
populism and techno-populism. Both political approaches have been often described as
striving to appeal to “ordinary people” (i.e., those who self-perceive as alien to any
political/economic elite) advancing anti-elitist and anti-establishment stances (Mudde
2019). However, right-wing populism(s) tend to emphasize opposition to external
immigration, anti-environmentalism, neo-nationalism, and protectionism (Greven
2016; Mudde 2019), whilst techno-populisms “predominantly, if not exclusively,
compete by focusing on nonpositional issues such as the fight against corruption,
increased transparency, democratic reform and moral integrity” (Zulianello 2020, p.
329), whilst highlighting the political significance of information technologies
(Caramani 2017; Jansen 2017; Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti 2018; De Blasio and
Sorice 2018).
Contemporary right-wing populism and techno-populism perspectives can converge
in one single movement, or, like in the Italian case, characterize two parties in a
coalition (Deseriis 2017; De Blasio and Sorice 2018; Brubaker 2020). In the latter
case, the available literature focuses on preliminary differences and commonalities
between those two stances and less on the dynamics that make them compatible
(Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti 2018). These dynamics are particularly interesting
when techno-populism advances a value-based emancipatory understanding of tech-
nology (as, I contend here, the 5SM does). Additionally, although in the literature there
is engagement with long-term political-economic factors, policy-outcomes, and polit-
ical struggles from which “new” populisms emerge (De Blasio and Sorice 2018), there
is a dearth of studies on the cultural formations enabling (and fed by) “new” populisms,
from an anti-positivist angle (cf. Deseriis 2017).
Against this backdrop, this article provides a discursive analysis of the Yellow-
Green assemblage arguing that combining a right-wing party and a techno-populist
movement does not equate to creating a subject that simply includes both groups’
properties held together by political convenience (Prodi 2019). I contend that through
certain epistemic, aesthetic, and affective dynamics some new properties arise whilst
old ones are erased or emphasized, not without conflicts. Differently from other
discursive analyses of techno-populism (Deseriis 2017), in this article the “techno”
element of the Yellow-Green coalition is not (only) related to the use of information
communications technology to achieve populist ends neither (only) to an epistemic
techne (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti 2018). Technology emerges as characterized
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by normative, affective, and aesthetic dimensions integral to a way of apprehending and
rationalising the social world, instantiated in specific political tactics. Similarly, the
“populist” element is more aptly qualifiable as “sovereignist,” that is, as advancing
mythological-theological themes to appeal to (and circularly constitute) “the people.”
Lastly, the analysis brings to the fore some key (and under-researched) constitutive
tensions characterising the Italian case, their effects, and how to radicalize them from a
strategic-normative perspective.
Analytical strategy
Methodologically, this article is informed by a re-elaboration of Michel Foucault’s
notion of “governmentality” (Foucault 2007, 2008). In his courses at the Collège de
France, between 1977 and 1979, Foucault reflected on how, in Europe, institutional/
state power starting from the nineteenth century came to build itself around the
relationships between population (i.e., people’s lives within a certain environment),
government (i.e., the processes of defining the conditions for living) and security (as
strategical effect of specific relations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity). As Rose
and Miller have suggested “in his remarks on ‘governmentality’ Foucault sketches an
alternative analytic of political power [that] sought to draw attention to a certain way of
thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth,
health and happiness of populations” (1992, p. 174). This analytic approach focuses on
the epistemic strategies involved in the exercise of power and namely on the practices
that frame certain phenomena as problems whose solutions justify the very existence of
those exerting institutional power; on how such solutions are instantiated in operational
programs, procedures, and techniques (whose effects retroact on those preliminary
framings) targeting (and circularly constituting) a population; and on the overall
rationalities (modes of apprehending and rationalising the social world) that can be
drawn from the first two operations.
More recently, Rose (2017) has maintained that by using a “governmentality
approach” we might understand some under-researched features of contemporary
populism. The main point in Rose’s argument is that, while populist movements in,
e.g., France, Austria, the United States, and the United Kingdom, may be “ephemeral,”
they may begin to articulate a new set of rationalities and technologies for governing
“after neoliberalism” (Rose 2017, p. 319). By looking at the new “ways of thinking”
espoused by populist movements, it is possible to detect their key operative concepts,
which, according to Rose, are “the people,” liberty, security, and control.
This article builds on Rose’s proposal, expanding critically the governmentality
approach to include not only epistemic but also affective and mythological (Jesi 1976,
1979) dimensions whilst considering how to counter them, from a normative-strategic
angle. From this analytical endeavour, progressive anti-authoritarian politics “might
have something to learn about” the premises and functioning, as well as the possibility
of contesting populist assemblages (Rose 2017, p. 310). If instead the Yellow-Green
subject were downgraded to a mere product of political convenience (e.g., Prodi 2019)
such a “learning experience” would be obliterated. This does not mean that political
convenience (e.g., leaders’ political ambitions, reputational gains, and mere contingent
interests) did not play a role in determining that coalition’s life-course. It rather means
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that by using critically the approach outlined above we may be able to develop insights
into the premises and workings of a “new” populist subject, which could be possibly
generalized. In fact, although the findings presented below in the third and fourth
sections partly converge with the extant literature on populism (e.g., Mudde 2004;
Natale and Ballatore 2014; Pratt and Miao 2017; De Blasio and Sorice 2018), the
remainder of the article brings to the fore fine-grained aspects of the Italian case that
suggest, from a comparative perspective, considering similar features in other populist
assemblages.
The article starts by analysing the economic, social, and cultural issues framed as
political “problems” by the Yellow-Green coalition (Rose and Miller 1992 p. 174). The
second step involves reconstructing how the coalition addressed those issues by
devising and deploying certain political technologies (Miller and Rose 1990, p. 8).
From examining these two dimensions, it is possible to infer those political rationalities,
which, through strategic combinations (Rose et al. 2006, p. 88), drove precariously the
Yellow-Green art of government (Rose and Miller 1992, p. 175). Problematics,
technologies, and rationalities are reconstructed inductively by piecing together scien-
tific knowledge, ethical doctrines, and cultural narratives encoded in a plurality of texts
produced by the coalition (cf. Maglione 2019). Namely, the article considers the
Contract for the Government of Change 2018, the 5SM Political Program 2018 and
The League Political Program 2018, some much-acclaimed policy measures,that is, the
Security and Immigration Decree 4 October 2018 n. 113 (“security package” 2018) and
the Order and Public Security Decree 14 June 2019 n. 53 (“security package” 2019) as
well as public speeches, interviews, and social media statements released by the
coalition’s leaders. Finally, the article reconstructs the “mythological machine” (Jesi
1976, 1979) that worked as the stabilizer of the Yellow-Green assemblage. This
“machine” is a key dimension of the Yellow-Green governmentality (and possibly of
any populist governmentality), a fluid range of “original” symbols generating the
cultural legitimation of the constitutively vacuous Italian “new” populism.
Problematics
The Yellow-Green coalition established itself around a range of social, political,
economic, and cultural phenomena, framed as historical crises to be addressed through
a combination of “unprecedented” interventions. Such “problematics”—post-2008
Italian economic-financial crisis, mass (extra-European Union) immigration, crisis of
public order/security, and lack of political representation of certain areas of the
citizenry—were only partly the result of the integration of the two parties’ political
repertoires. In fact, coalition-specific conceptualisations also emerged, not without
tensions.
Economic-financial crisis
A situation routinely evoked by Yellow-Green leaders was the Italian economic-
financial crisis, particularly exacerbated after the 2008 crash. The main factor in the
generation of this predicament was considered the EU’s conduct, seen as either
helplessly caught up in such a crisis or responsible for it. As the Contract of
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Government stated, “Historically the Italian Government has been submissive in
Europe ... often preferring to leave the field to European interests opposed to national
[economic] needs” (p. 9). The rhetorical operator in action here is the drawing of a neat
dividing line between national economic “victims” and regional economic “perpetra-
tors.” The specific causes of the Italian crisis, in fact, were deemed the EU single
currency (based on German monetary standards), the “interference” in national politics
(e.g., Bruxelles’ pressures to replace Berlusconi’s government in 2008 with an unelect-
ed “government of experts”) as well as the EU austerity fiscal rules (decided in remote
venues by bureaucrats, merely aiming to raise taxes and reduce public spending as a
way of reassuring the markets) (5SM 2018 Program, EU section; The League 2018
Program, Europe section). The 2008 financial crash was used as a symbolic signpost in
this narrative. Its roots were described as the policy failures and large-scale bank
bailouts, at both national and regional level (Engesser et al. 2017, p. 1117; Funke
and Trebesch 2017, p. 8). As the Contract of Government declared, "The banking bail
system has caused the destabilization of the credit in Italy with negative consequences
for families, who have been expropriated of their own savings" (p. 14). Again, there
was a clear divide between economic-financial elites (i.e., bankers) and “the people”:
the first ones thrived out of the crisis whilst the latter paid its price. As The League’s
2018 Program promised, a “fiscal peace” (i.e., a tax condone) was necessary to re-
establish economic justice after the crisis, and this would apply only to the financial
crisis’ victims, i.e., families and small businesses, and not to “large tax evaders” (p. 4).
With respect to economic policy at least one source of tensions between The League
and the 5SM should be noted. The latter, in fact, has traditionally advocated for radical
environment-friendly policies, widely reflected in the 5SM Political Program 2018.
This area was also considered in The League Program 2018, even though here it was
emphasized the need to strike a balance between market and environment (p. 35).
Environmental policies for The League are fundamentally economic matters, whilst for
the 5SM the environment is an autonomous (normative) subject. The Contract of
Government emphatically stated the need to “put the ecological issue at the centre of
politics” (p. 10), however, all the substantive claims here seemed to express the implicit
equation between environment and green economy, highlighting the partial devaluation
of a 5SM’s flagship claim.
Immigration’s emergency
Immigration, framed as an emergency, and the economic-financial crisis were defined by the
Yellow-Green coalition as inextricably linked. The “failure of the immigration system” is
“clear,” as prime minister Conte stated during his first speech at the Senate (Il Sole 24Ore,
June 5, 2018). This earnest claim echoed the Contract of Government’s diagnosis that “The
current migration crisis is unsustainable for Italy, given its costs [bearing on] public funds ...
often handled with little transparency and permeable to infiltration of organized crime” (p.
26). Fighting human trafficking was the “humanitarian” justification for a stricter immigra-
tion policy: “It is essential to disrupt the smugglers’ business which has caused landings and
deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and dismantle organizations of international criminals who
traffic in human beings” (p. 27). The “immigration business” refers to both professional
smugglers and NGOs (mainly sea rescue missions) allegedly exploiting the solidarity-
business for their own financial gain. The League 2018 Program 2018 committed to “Refuse
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to disembark for NGOs [vessels] at the margins of the Libyan territorial sea, since their
requests [to disembark] are based on self-induced shipwrecks and are a prelude to the
exploitation of illegal immigration” (p. 6). Similarly, the Contract promised “transparency”
regarding the financial operations of organisations that run immigration support services and
those that operate rescue missions (p. 27). More explicitly, the Yellow-Green leaders
emphatically described NGO rescue vessels as “sea taxis” complicit in human trafficking
(La Repubblica, June 8, 2018a; Hufftington Post, January 30, 2018).
Regarding immigrants, these were portrayed as indulging in lifestyles and adhering
to beliefs often antagonistic to those of the Italian nation. However, although Salvini
affirmed during the 2018 general election campaign that “[immigrants are] an army of
benefit thieves and criminals” and then, once he became Home Office Secretary, that
for illegal immigrants “the party is over” (La Repubblica, June 2, 2018b), the 5SM
more cautiously preferred to frame immigrants as passive victims of human traffickers
(Reuters, August 5, 2017).
From an explanatory angle, this two-sided representation related less to fears of
racial contamination—i.e., on the assumption that immigrants threaten the racial
integrity of the nation (Padovani 2018, p. 5565)—and more to economic fears of
“too many” immigrants collapsing the system (McDonnell and Vampa 2016, p. 155).
There was not an explicit biological racist claim here, since the coalition expressed its
arguments in race-neutral or “colourblind”’ language (cf. Hogan and Haltinner 2015, p.
533; Bonilla-Silva 2019, p. 2).
“Race” was an off topic, but the fear of “religious” contamination was often
underlined. As the Contract of Government stated: “For the purposes of transparency
[and] of preventing possible terrorist infiltration ... it is necessary to adopt ad hoc
legislation on registering the ministers of worship and on the traceability of the funding
for the construction of mosques” (p. 28). Additionally, “control and immediate closure
of all radical Islamic associations as well as mosques and places of worship, however
called, which are irregular” (p. 28) were promised . This religious-based suspicion had
as a specific target a generalized Islam against which The League’s leader would use
catholic claims and iconography, e.g., by kissing the rosary in highly mediatized public
events (Il Fatto Quotidiano, May 27, 2019).
Security’s decline
In the government’s policy the immigration/security link was insistently stressed (the
2019 security package’s official name was “Security and Immigration Decree”), often
employing “asylum seekers” as a critical discursive object. From this perspective, the
Contract of Government maintained that “... in order to guarantee a correct balance
between [immigration] security and public order, it is then necessary to establish that
offenses committed by asylum seekers will justify their immediate removal from the
national territory” (p. 27). An implicit connection between asylum seeking and crime
was drawn, whereas the mere existential condition of “asylum seeking” would qualify
an offence as more serious, justifying a ban/removal from the host nation. The League,
more than the 5SM, historically engaged in building a contentious relation between
immigration and crime, “by establishing an explicative chain, at the same time causal,
rational and metaphoric, to connect immigrants, unemployment, criminality, welfare
crisis, taxes and future uncertainties” (Biorcio and Vitale 2011, p. 186).
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According to The League’s political discourse, (illegal) immigrants produce
insecurity and the stopping of all incoming immigrants is a national priority
(Brunazzo and Roux 2013, p. 20) as also epitomized by the 2018 and 2019
“security packages” (see below).
However, insecurity is not only about immigrants’ invasion. A further (domestic)
expression of the current security’s crisis, partly shared by the 5SM, was the idea of
“moral security” weakened by two different phenomena: the recognition of civil rights
to same-sex unions and the diffusion of “immoral” crimes, i.e., corruption. The League
started its fight against same-sex unions in 2016, when Salvini publicly invited mayors
to “disobey the [same-sex civil unions] law” (Il Fatto Quotidiano, May 11, 2016)
whilst declaring that “There is only one family: the natural one,”2 built around a man
and a woman (The League 2018 Program, p. 51). The 5SM instead never openly
countered same-sex unions with traditional familistic claims, oscillating between early
support and a relative indifference toward the topic.3 The other domestic security threat,
this time conceptualized similarly by both parties, was corruption, a typical elite crime,
against whom new punitive and remoralising measures were promised (5SM 2018
Program, p. 2; The League 2018 Program, p. 32). The Contract of Government, in fact,
identified an ad hoc punishment for corrupt civil servants, that is, a perpetual ban from
public offices additional to tougher penal (custodial) measures (p. 30).
Lack of voice
Conte in his first speech at the Senate proclaimed that “If ‘populism’ is the attitude of
the ruling class to listen to people’s needs [then we] deserve this qualification” (Il Sole
24Ore, June 5, 2018). The “world wide web” within this context was presented as
facilitating the articulation of people’s voice. As Conte assuredly added, “Internet
access must be guaranteed to all citizens as a fundamental right and a precondition
for the effective exercise of democratic rights” (Il Sole 24Ore, June 5, 2018). This
understanding was a distinctive 5SM’s contribution to the Yellow-Green alliance.
Within the 5SM narrative, the web offers endless and new political possibilities, and
in fact, in the 2018 Program “Connectivity” was one of the macro-subjects, with
“30 min free internet for poor people” being a much-voiced promise during the 2018
electoral campaign (La Repubblica, June 26, 2018c). The web is viewed as a
liberating force, the main actor of change within a free-market-oriented under-
standing of progress (Natale and Ballatore 2014, p. 112). It is a “supermedium”
(Casaleggio and Grillo 2011, p. 7) that will radically transform all social,
informational, and organizational processes and will contribute to remoralising
politics by reducing “corruption in a technologically deterministic way, foster-
ing radical transparency” (Natale and Ballatore 2014, p. 112).
Overall, the 5SM’s discourse shares some themes with the so-called “Californian
ideology,” that is, a combination between anarcho-libertarian stances (i.e., direct
democracy), laissez-faire capitalism and technological determinism that emerged in
2 Retrieved from The League’s official website https://www.leganord.org/index.php/notizie2/8607-La_
famiglia_%C3%A8_una_sola-_quella_naturale
3 Retrieved from the 5SM’s official blog https://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/2019/04/il-nostro-impegno-per-le-
famiglie-in-10-punti.html
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the 1990s from the US high-tech industry (Natale and Ballatore 2014, p. 112). This
ideology is characterized by a strong faith in the emancipatory power of the new digital
technologies, and fuses (not without tensions) aspects of anti-corporate ethos with a
laissez-faire approach to the economy. The 5SM’s cyber-narrative particularly empha-
sizes the “electronic agora” of direct democracy and less the neoliberal “electronic
marketplace” driven by competition and efficiency (Natale and Ballatore 2014, p. 112).
The remainder of this article will show that some of the political tensions within the
coalition were rooted in the 5SM and The Leagues’ diverging understandings of
technology and its political purchase.
Political technologies
The solutions imagined by the Yellow-Green coalition to what they framed as national
emergencies were then addressed by “mundane programmes, calculations, techniques,
apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities [sought] to embody
and give effect to governmental ambitions” (Rose and Miller 1992, p. 175). Namely,
such technologies focussed on enforcing a defensive-reactive type of social order,
ensuring an exclusive type of citizenship linked to programs to regenerate the nation
and emphasising the new political role(s) of digital technologies.
Enforcing defensive security
The 2018 “security package” and its 2019 follow-up were presented as flagship
Yellow-Green interventions. These established a number of measures marked by a
“law and order” approach, e.g., tightening up to 4 years of penalties for “squatting,”
extra funding for police forces, and financial penalties for each irregular immigrant sea-
rescued and brought to Italy. Similarly, mayors were empowered to take new admin-
istrative initiatives in order to improve their towns’ “decency,” e.g., by banning people
who were a “threat to public health” from so-called “red zones” (e.g., public parks or
schools’ proximities), by closing Roma people’s dwellings and by policing more
strictly public protests. These were all administrative acts that limited people’s basic
freedoms (e.g., circulation) on fluid grounds (e.g., decency), weakening typical rule of
law safeguards. Here, the new rules on self-defence occupied a special place. The 2018
“security package” established that self-defence is always legitimate (i.e., it is always
proportionate regardless of the threat) when it takes place within one’s home. This
measure expressed a functional equivalence between “security”—i.e., social response
to essential needs—and “defence”—i.e., violent protection from external dangers—and
between one’s “home” and “our country,” elevating the self-enforcement of rules to a
non-negotiable value (Panarari 2018).
Within this context, a certain concept of “victimhood” acquired an unprecedented
political saliency. The Yellow-Green assemblage gave great “emphasis to victims’
accounts of their experiences, rather than to the detached, objective analysis of experts.
In this respect, crime victims [are] given a new kind of authenticity and authority” (Pratt
and Miao 2017, p. 13). Victims are respectable, ordinary citizens whose experience
becomes universal as the danger they face—they are “the people” (Rose 2017), whose
interests are defended by “new” populisms. The coalition’s victims were the “family”
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(declined as “traditional family” within The League’s narrative) challenged by the
economic crisis and new non-conformist same-sex unions as well as the taxpayers’
betrayed by corrupted political elites holding public offices and threatened by the
“immigrants’ invasion.” This victimhood is something more than being a crime victim,
it is a permanent state of potential victimisation (an existential fear) conflated with fears
of otherness that inform people’s daily conduct and “demand preventive measures that
erode fundamental features of public law and criminal justice in modern society” (Pratt
and Miao 2017, p. 13).
Ensuring ascriptive citizenship
Two different concepts of citizenship featured in the Yellow-Green political programs.
The first referred to citizenship as a status (typified by The League’s motto ‘Prima gli
italiani!’ [Italians First!]) (The Guardian, December 1, 2018), that is, an ascriptive idea
of citizenship (De Blasio and Sorice 2018, p. 3). From this angle, The League’s 2018
Program symbolically stated that “for a ‘refugee’ the State will not commit funds higher
than those allocated to a 100% disability pension of an Italian citizen” (p. 7). The other
concept, advanced by the 5SM, was that of citizenship as a body of civic knowledge
(affiliative citizenship), represented as a tool to improve the quality of democracy
towards a participatory style” (De Blasio and Sorice 2018, p. 3).
However, in the government’s practice, The League’s concept took priority. The
“security packages,” and particularly the new rules on immigrants’ reception centers,
were clearly informed by a citizenship-as-status concept. The 2018 “security package”
extended the permanence-confinement within reception centers from 90 to 180 days
and established that citizenship was revoked for foreigners who committed crimes not
necessarily serious and even for those who returned to their country for a short period.
Broad requirements (which give room for arbitrary administrative interpretation) for the
granting of citizenship were introduced, e.g., absence of convictions, irreprehensible
conduct, minimum income, fulfillment of tax obligations, as well as the extension of
the terms for investigating the acquisition of citizenship. Perhaps the most paradigmatic
provisions here were the cancellation of “humanitarian protection” as a ground for
granting asylum and the exclusion of the local council’s registration for asylum seekers.
The first measure included also the denial of renewing the humanitarian asylum for
those who were already granted it, causing in this way a massive “irregularization” of
immigrants (Firouzi Tabar 2018). The second was a clear message to “asylum seekers”:
they are not integral to the polity, not even when it comes to basic welfare provisions
dependent on the registration into the local council’s registry.
This emergencial approach to immigration, i.e., the focus on containment/
selection of migratory movements conceptualized as a security threat, appeared
as integral to this political technology. However, it should be remarked a partial
inconsistency between the two components of the Yellow-Green assemblage
with respect to this point. The 5SM 2018 Program (Immigration section), in
fact, openly criticized the emergencial approach to immigration, whilst stressing
the need for a “fair sharing of responsibilities” at the EU level in the “man-
agement/distribution of immigrants.” Additionally, it advocated for “internation-
al humanitarianism” to tackle the root causes of global migration flows. The
points of convergence with The League were then confined to the
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conceptualisation of immigration as a “problem” and an economic-oriented
approach to “immigration management.”
Producing “people’s economics”
Yellow-Green political-economic technologies were informed by an ambivalent and
contradictory attitude towards capitalism. In general, the 5SM has traditionally framed
the web as both the ultimate marketplace and a virtual agora that will be populated by
more informed and rational citizens (Natale and Ballatore 2014, p. 114). Additionally,
it has advocated for measures supposedly ensuring equality of opportunity and active
political and economic citizenship such as the universal basic income. The
League instead has always supported market-oriented economic policies (Biorcio and
Vitale 2011, p. 195), as expressed by traditional claims to reduce the power of unions
and to extend the enterprises’ freedom of laying off. At the same time, both parties
espoused projects of economic nationalisation, promising the creation of a national
bank for investments (Contract of Government, p. 13).
The Contract proposed two types of measures to tackle the economic-financial crisis
that cut across the ambivalent attitude seen above. The first type consisted of “anti-EU”
instruments. From this perspective, the Contract promised that, after the revisions of
EU treaties, policies would have been funded by a multi-year plan “to cut wasteful
spending, manage debt and an appropriate and limited recourse to deficit spending”
(Contract of Government, p. 17), instead of by fiscal austerity measures backed by the
EU. The second group were “people-oriented” measures. The Contract established
tougher sanctions, including prison, for tax evaders, managers, and regulators respon-
sible for bank failures as well as a tax condone for people struggling to pay tax arrears.
The abolition of the pension reform that raised the retirement age, cuts to so-called
“golden pensions,” and a national bank for investments were also highly touted
measures. Finally, the 5SM’s flagship intervention: the creation of a universal basic
income (emphatically called “citizen income”) for the unemployed (Contract of Gov-
ernment, p. 34). This was described as a “conditional universal” support: recipients are
obliged to look for work and accept one of the first three job offers received, otherwise
the support will be revoked. The citizen income applies also to people who are not
Italian citizens, however with strict conditions (10 years regular residence minimum,
last 2 years with no interruptions, income certification in Italian from the applicant’s
State).
In this context, there were some tensions between a market-oriented approach (The
League) and a more left-libertarian vision (5SM). The League in fact has always been
wary of any type of income support, seemingly discouraging (particularly immigrants’)
“hard work” (La Stampa, May 30, 2019). Yet, there was convergence on projects of
economic nationalization (i.e., the creation of a national investment bank) and on anti-
EU and people-oriented measures such as the fiscal condone or punitive measures for
bank managers.
Regenerating the nation
The structural conflict between “globalisation losers” to “globalisation winners”’ is a
well-known populist trope (Campani and Pajnik 2017). This translates into claims of
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restoring national sovereignty as the only way to empower national losers. Both The
League and the 5SM were sympathetic to a return to (or at least re-empowering of) the
nation states, recovering sovereignty from supranational institutions, such as the EU.
The demands of “more nation” were articulated mainly by displaying traditional
(even folkloristic) Italian strengths and by contesting the effects of globalisation.
Regarding the first rhetorical strategy, the 5SM 2018 Program, for instance, highlighted
“the valorisation of the made in Italy” by an “e-commerce platform for made in Italy
products in the world, greater protection of cultural assets, safeguarding the quality of
Italian products threatened by international treaties” (p. 1). Similarly, the Contract
emphasized that “Italy is a nation with a touristic vocation thanks to the historical,
cultural, landscape and natural heritage and to excellence such as, for example, food
and wine, fashion, design, unique in the world” (p. 50).
The League is a rather unique case of a regionalist party “gone national,” leaving its
original claims for northern regional autonomy behind (Albertazzi et al. 2018, p. 650).
In their 2018 Program’s cover page there was a clear reference to “The pride to belong
to the most beautiful country in the world,” whilst in the “security packages” there were
several expressions of this “defensive” approach (e.g., citizenship is revoked for
foreigners who commit crimes not necessarily serious or stricter requirements for
granting citizenship). A further strategy to recover people’s lost sovereignty, particu-
larly espoused by the 5SM, is participatory democracy. By using a software (called
“Rousseau”) that enables “certified” party members to vote on issues selected by party
leaders in order to inform parliamentary action, “the people” apparently become
rational citizens, active stakeholders informing policy instead of passive entities ruled
more than ruling (Mosca and Tronconi 2019, p. 1261).
Rebuilding the nation was presented as something beyond the right/left spectrum, a non-
negotiable priority. As one of the intellectuals close to the 5SM claimed: “The future political
conflict will no longer be between the right and the left, but between those who accept
globalization and thosewhowish to challenge it. Globalists against sovereignists, so that being
against globalization means, today, recovering the idea of nation” (Becchi 2017, p. 104).
Digitalizing politics
Networked communication platforms constituted the theatre whereby Yellow-Green
politics was re-formulated, in a direct, intimate, simple, and denunciatory way. How-
ever, to think of them as mere communication means would be appropriate only for
The League’s approach to social media, whereas a 5SM’s key contribution to the
coalition was to advance a broader normative understanding of digital technologies
(and not simply social media).
From the “instrumentalist” perspective, social media are not bound to the mediation of
traditional gatekeepers, supporting a direct link between politics and citizens that bypasses
professional norms and news values of mass media (Engesser et al. 2017). The elites were
often said to control the traditional media,4 hence social networked platforms would help
overcome such a supposed obstacle. In fact, populist leaders often claim to speak directly to
“the people” by using such “structurally disintermediate” communication forms (Bracciale
4 The official 5SM blog has dedicated a large number of posts to this subject https://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/
2018/09/la_proprieta_dei_giornali_andra_indicata_nella_testata.html
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andMartella 2017, pp. 1311–1312). Among these newmedia, Twitter plays a central role in
hybridising and redefining the traditional cycle of political information, since conversations
that take place there often influence the coverage and agenda of traditional media.
During the coalition’s life, the Home Office Secretary (@matteosalvinimi), tweeted
an average of 4000 times and posts an average of 1000 pictures per year, and the 5SM
(@Mov5Stelle) an average of 3000 per year). Salvini also used automated profiles and
bots to support Twitter’s multiplicative effects (Piccinelli 2019). In January 2019, the
hashtag #SalviniNonMollare (advocating Salvini’s judicial immunity) generated 25
million retweets while the new tweets were 90 thousand, using bots and automated
profiles (Piccinelli 2019).
Further, networked social media are characterized by emotionalizing storytelling by
sharing feelings, moods, or revealing insights, in an informal, simple, and taboo braking
way (Bracciale and Martella 2017, p. 1314). This perfectly fitted with The League’s
communication style encapsulated by viral pictures of Salvini driving bulldozers with
reference to how to “end” Roma dwellings or wearing shirts with police or fire service
insignia, systematically posted on twitter (BBC, January 7, 2019). Similarly, the use of
hashtags such as #STOPINVASIONE [Stop Invasion] or #starbucksgohome expressed the
aggressive, emotionalized, and dichotomic political narrative espoused by The League.
Social media also offer a new denunciatory-acclamatory instrument. By providing a
virtual scaffold to condemn elites publicly, social media contribute toward an immedi-
ate, here-and-now vilification of the enemies even as they “promote a kind of public
virtue” (Sanscartier 2017, p. 61). Salvini’s statement “you must live on Mars” to Tito
Boeri, chairman of the National Social Welfare Institute (INPS), when the latter
contested some data provided by the Home Office (Il Giornale, July 5, 2018),
epitomized this denunciatory-acclamatory character, aiming to incite public sentiment,
affect, or mood against elites/experts who are removed from people’s real problems
(Dean 2017, p. 419).
However, as stated above, technology from the 5SM’s perspective is (mainly) a norma-
tive ideal. Technology—namely the Internet—not only enables but actually is the space of
direct democracy. The Internet is where political delegation appears as both immoral and
unnecessary, the key condition for the formation of a collective and intelligent political will.
For this reason, although “Rousseau” and the 5SM’s Blog were key political technologies,
the Internet remained a normative ideal (BBC News, December 7, 2012), to be empowered
to realize, as Casaleggio argued, a “digital revolution that would flatten the priesthoods of
politics, government, and journalism, and replace them with decentralized webs of direct
participation” (Wired, February 14, 2019).
Political rationality
It is now possible to infer from the problems, solutions, and technologies outlined
above a tangle of common epistemic, moral, aesthetic, and theologico-political traits
that can be then pieced together into an overall political rationality. This is a heuristic
device that helps understand how the coalition’s internal tensions were (precariously)
stabilized by generating a common “mentality.”
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Epistemic modes
The Yellow-Green assemblage, similarly to other “new” populist movements, routinely
dichotomized “perpetrators” and “victims,” drawing on common knowledge as it
simplified and emotionalized public issues. Dichotomisation is a typical populist
epistemic strategy, well implemented by networked social communication platforms.
As Mudde remarked (Mudde 2004, p. 543), one of the defining aspects that renders any
populism a “thin” ideology is that they “consider society to be ultimately separated into
two homogenous and antagonistic groups—“the pure people” versus the “corrupt
elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale
(general will) of the people.” By dichotomising public issues, the Yellow-Green art of
government demanded people to make in/out decisions, further generating dichoto-
mous friend/enemy distinctions (cf. Schmitt 2007). This epistemological strategy enacts
a form of drastic polarisation: any issue is simplified and trivialized until its good/bad
essence emerges and in/out decisions can be made. Examples are the dichotomies of
self-defence/self-endangerment, Italians first/immigrants’ invasion, technological inno-
vation/stagnation, moralising politics/corruption.
The “common sense” or “people’s knowledge” is the only source of valid knowl-
edge, well symbolized by The League’s 2018 Program’s subtitle—“The common sense
revolution.” As Rose argued, “For knowledge is not to come from the experts with
their arcane languages, their supposedly scientific calculations that have so often
proved wrong, their demeaning of “common sense.” On the contrary, to see is to
know—the knowledge that is to inform this rationality is the knowledge that “everyone
knows”’ (Rose 2017, p. 314). This particularly applies to immigration as a security
threat: “the proposition that immigration increases crime is often presented as common
knowledge, requiring little empirical proof” (Hogan and Haltinner 2015, p. 529), but
also to the basic universal income as an instrument to ensure “active citizenship.”
This epistemological apparatus individualizes responsibilities for immigration or
economic failings, andthe causes of corruption. It obliterates deeper and broader
economic, social, and cultural contradictions that may underpin political problematics,
in the name of “the common sense revolution” (cf. Rose 1998, p. 165).
A final epistemic mode characterising the Yellow-Green rationality, was its “crisis-
making” approach to reality. The coalition’s gaze consistently construed political
problems as crises, once again simplifying epistemically the social reality. Such crises
were evoked, mediated, and performed, becoming a precious rhetorical-symbolical
resource to be exploited to radicalize the political debate and advocate for a strong
leadership (Moffitt 2015). A crisis here is a dangerous situation (e.g., immigration’s
emergency or security’s decline) that poses people at immediate risk, it is self-evident
and polarising, requires immediate interventions (“security packages,” custodial pun-
ishments for corrupt bankers, etc.) and limited negotiations, accompanied by a public
display of the “successful” responses
Affective strategies
The Yellow-Green political rationality is both emotionally productive and repressive. It
evokes and channels people’s interests and desires into emotional demands toward “the
other” (EU, asylum seekers, NGOs), it draws friend-enemy boundaries, it prioritises
Theory and Society
blame for moral wrongdoing as a critical political experience. The idea of excluding by
inclusion “the other” contributes toward creating a form of affective justice that very
much resembles lynching (Berg 2011). Exactly like lynching, the Yellow-Green
coalition aimed to retaliate against the perpetrators, dishonouring and degrading them
publicly, with a “cathartic release of powerful emotions” (Garland 2005, p. 820). The
“stagers” of lynching spectacles deliberately choose to transgress the “traditional” (non-
technological, remissive toward EU, corrupt) forms of politics, to make themselves
exceptions to the rule (Garland 2005, p. 829). In this way, they become the external
enforcers of a sovereignty that applies to “the people” and their enemies but not to the”
exceptional” sovereign itself.
Operationally, lynching de-socializes security and securitizes personal safety
(Schuilenburg 2012, p. 75). Security becomes a mere negative/private state of immunisation
from moral risks and dangers—e.g., immigrants and corrupted elites—justified by an
inconsistent array of classical liberal themes (non-intrusion in “home affairs,” self-defence),
libertarian motives (techno-enabled politics), right-wing appeals (to the nation and the
“traditional family”), and neoliberal claims (market-orientation). Clearly, this promised state
of security can never be achieved; life cannot be completely secured, without killing life
itself, and dangers cannot be exorcized without re-evoking them (Kotsko 2018, p. 2).
Therefore, lynching is a program in endless tension, targeting phantoms of otherness more
than material conditions of security (Chandler and Reid 2016).
Lynching is pleasure-giving. It allows “the people” to exert their “freedom-against”
suitable enemies, providing a space for a here-and-now catharsis. In this context,
whether policy achieves its goals is irrelevant. Actually, policy failures are integral to
this mode of governing whose main goal is being in tension toward the pleasure-giving
(and impossible) immunisation from moral risks and dangers. This affective dynamic
has a distinctive subjectivizing effect—it generates non-people. To some extent, and
paradoxically, this is a “populism without people” (Revelli 2018). Yellow-Green non-
people are individuals glued together by a reactive solidarity bond against “the others,”
representing the end of all previous socio-political subjectivities. The Northern people,
the techno-people, the people of the right were recombined (Revelli 2018) as a
collection of atoms bound together by reactive affects, a “non-people” otherwise devoid
of a “self,” more than, e.g. a traditional fascist Volk. To closer inspection, this non-
people was particularly informed by The League’s powerful affective strategies, which
to some extent co-opted and neutralized the 5SM’s original ideas of citizen-experts or
immigrants-as-victims.
Mythological operations
For the Yellow-Green governmentality, the mythopoesis served the purpose of stabi-
lizing its constitutively unstable (and vacuous) identity. A “mythological machine” is a
way of thinking about how human groups constitute themselves as a culture, i.e., how
they produce their own origins, and what enables this operation, i.e., a mechanism that
generates legitimising/foundational materials, an engine of original stories, whose
origins are however inaccessible (Jesi 1976). These mythological stories are fabricated
by manipulating historical materials to produce an eternal present cast against an
idealized past and projected toward a redemptive future. History’s conflicts and
nuances are neutralized, and the uncertainty that constitutes the future is erased, to
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legitimize the present. This machine is both aesthetic and political since it simulta-
neously engenders literary space (social media narratives), imaginary (the pure nation,
the web as “supermedium”), utopia (a moralized place with no immigrant or crime),
and alternative experiences of existence (the possibility of enfranchising “the people”)
(Belpoliti and Manera 2010). The coalition’s aesthetic element was particularly salient.
The Yellow-Green mythologies, in fact, consisted of emotionally-loaded and destruc-
tive images (e.g., the bulldozer vs. Roma camps or “sea taxis” vs. rescue vessels)
entangled with “wordless ideas” (Jesi 1979, p. 24), i.e., normative and “self-explana-
tory” keywords: Nation, Web, Sovereignty, People, Immigrants, Elites. These images-
plus-language ultimately worked as self-referential justifications, “original-with-no-
origin,” passed as obvious and natural. Their “essential” nature was possibly ensured
by their theological roots (Jesi 1979, p. 186; cf. Schmitt 2005). The reactive idea of
sovereignty as people’s vengeance against elites was the transcendent core of the
Yellow-Green art of government opposed to purely secularized political assemblages
(e.g., the EU, corrupted political elites). Both the muscular leaders officiating this
expiatory vengeance as messianic figures and the purity (national and technological)
they cultivated, appear as theological images. Purity is ‘the people’s defining feature,
their assumed moral integrity intensified to the highest—transcendent—degree. Pure is
both the nation and the web’s redemptive force, their creative-destructive tension,
ensuring not only cohesion, transparency, and efficiency, but also a messianic palin-
genesis. Similarly, the idea of victimhood as a “substance, essence, intrinsic nature ...
ensures the [theological] nexus between innocence and potency” (Giglioli 2014, p. 57),
legitimising any claim, making irresponsible the claimant though demanding their
salvation. By the same token, who acts in the victim’s name is, by definition, doing
justice more than politics and as such appealing to higher non-negotiable beliefs, which
require responses based on faith more than reason.
From this perspective, it is possible to rationalize the populist “rage” against
immigrants and corrupt elites: both are vehicles of contamination (multicultural,
religious, and moral) of the people’s pure core. Therefore, they were included-by-
exclusion, framed as constitutive enemies to be evoked and sacrificed in order to fill the
vacuity of this political assemblage. This ultimately means that populism, not only the
Italian one, is not about blind rage, but about politics—constructing and conducting the
polity—grounded in mythologies, buried under a commonsense imaginary.
Techno-sovereignism
The Yellow-Green art of government generated (and provided “solutions” for) issues
overlapping with those produced by other right-wing or techno-populist movements,
i.e., economic-financial crisis, immigration emergency, security’s decline, people’s lack
of voice, and the need of technocratic means (Caramani 2017; Deseriis 2017). Simi-
larly, the technologies deployed to respond to such predicaments, i.e., penal-
administrative law, ethno-citizenship, political-economic and new media, were not
completely specific either. The Yellow-Green knowledge—dichotomising,
emotionalized—reducing any type of issue and their causes to moral wrongdoing and
therefore calling for lynching—enabled by virtual scaffolds (new social media)—also
seems recurrent in “new" populisms (Mudde 2004).
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However, the Italian case was characterized by the emergence of specific combina-
tions and tensions and this may suggest that similar dynamics are integral to other
“new” populist coalitions. The Yellow-Green assemblage included partly diverging
concepts of citizenship, economic policy, and immigration creating significant tensions
within the coalition. These tensions were stabilized (but not neutralized) by several
processes described above as constituting a mythological machine. The production of
legitimising material systematically passed on as common-sense and morally pure was
a key feature of this populism (and perhaps of any populism). Its political-theological
nature aimed to transform state sovereignty into a messianic force against immanent
political, social, and economic antagonists.
Techno-sovereignism, here, captures the (precarious) tangle of epistemic, affective, and
mythological operations underpinning the Yellow-Green modes of apprehending and
rationalising the social world. This rationality entails, as a common thread between right-
wing and techno-populist elements, the cultivation of a “centripetal” freedom fuelled by an
existential insecurity, whereby otherness is a threat to be constantly evoked as a constitutive
enemy (Rose 2017, pp. 316–317). Techno-sovereignism also captures the theological-
political transcendence of the nation (sovereignism) and the blurring of the boundaries
between polis and oikos through the web (technocracy) in order to produce a “new” political
agora. However, the web is not a mere means to achieve the greater end of avenging the
nation, as the tensions within the coalition highlighted. Technology and nation, in fact, are
predicated on diverging concepts of order, respectively: individuals instrumentally associ-
ated in bottom-up “tribes” and a national polity organized by centralisation and unification.
This appears as the fundamental cleavage at the heart of techno-sovreignism. The mytho-
logical materials layered upon this rift helped the Italian assemblage to survive, but the
constitutive tension remained as never fully reconciled.
These tensions (and the coalition’s endeavours to neutralize them) were particularly
visible with respect to the conceptualisation of “market,” “immigration,” and “envi-
ronment.” As for the former, on the one (sovereignist) hand, the market was stripped of
any theological connotation—a mere economic device to be used to empower non-
people; on the other, the market was the epistemic environment where technology
thrives and people empower themselves as active subjects supported by the “citizen
income.” The only connection between these two views was the framing of the
(capitalist) free market as a taken-for-granted pillar of the national economy. Regarding
immigration, the techno-sovereignist assemblage seemed to oscillate between civic
racism/nativism and economic “rationalisation,” finding a trait-d’union in the concep-
tualisation of immigration (particularly “Islamic”) as a crucial national problem.
There was also a clear opposition between The League’s economisation of environmental
issues and the 5SM autonomous environmentalism combined with a participatory democratic
approach. This opposition, exemplified by the Turin-Lyon railway issue (see next section),
was only partly covered (mythologically) by the ideas of “people’s economy” and the
restoration of “people’s voice,” remaining a significant fracture in theYellow-Greenmentality.
A key element that kept the techno-sovereignism assemblage together was its
redemptive promise. The coalition presented itself as the only force capable of freeing
the forgotten people from the shackles imposed upon them by corrupted elites, opening
a new messianic time where elites would atone, after lynching, for their moral faults
and “the people” would thrive in a secured political, social, and cultural space.
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Contesting techno-sovereignism
The Yellow-Green government ended due to The League’s motion against the slow
progress of the Turin–Lyon high-speed railway, a project contested by the 5SM due to
its environmental impact (The Telegraph,August 9, 2019). It is likely, as some analysts
have highlighted (The New York Times,August 20, 2019), that this conclusion was also
a matter of political convenience related to The League’s leader’s personal ambitions.
However, coherently with the approach adopted in this article, this section considers
heuristically how to radicalize the tensions affecting the techno-sovereignist mentality,
from a normative (anti-authoritarian) angle, in this way briefly providing additional
tools to contest other authoritarian/techno-populist groups.
A first strategy could be short-circuiting bottom up (Scott 1990) the mythological
machine that hid the constitutive tensions at the heart of that coalition. Operationally, a
first tactic could be the mediatisation of the “fearless speech” (Foucault 2001) through
new technologies. Examples of these were the public critiques put forth by Roberto
Saviano, a journalist who currently lives under around-the-clock police protection due
to his work on the Italian mafia, and the civil disobedience enacted by Domenico
Lucano, a mayor of a small Italian town (Riace) and by Carola Rackete, captain of the
rescue vessel Sea Watch-3. Saviano used consistently social media to expose the
strategic simplifications of the Home Office on immigration (e.g., by launching the
campaign #InMareNonEsistonoTaxi [In the open sea taxis do not exist]) and, as a
response, he was threatened by the Home Office to lose his police protection (La
Repubblica, June 21, 2019a). Lucano led an innovative approach to dealing with
refugees, allowing hundreds of them to settle among locals, revitalising Riace and
preventing the closure of the local schools (BBC, 10 January 2011). In return, he was
charged for helping illegal migrants to stay in the country. Rackete, in the summer
2019, decided to breach the Italian coast guard blockage in order to bring stranded
migrants to an Italian “safe harbour,” Lampedusa (France24, June 26, 2019), risking a
criminal charge and a custodial sentence.
Despite the Yellow-Green violent reactions, these “free speakers” kept contesting,
endangering their own life. In these cases, political contestation morphed into mediatized
civil disobedience, aiming both to radicalize the Yellow-Green contradictions, bringing to
the fore its bare violence (which is their affective cipher), and to generate new mythologies,
alternative imaginaries of co-existence built around the idea of social solidarity.
It is also possible to transform this parrhesia in a lower-threshold form of political
disentanglement. I am thinking here of some gestures, in Giorgio Agamben’s terms
(Agamben 2018), directed toward the Yellow-Green mythological machine. “Gesture”
here means any operation that renders a political mythological machine inoperative,
non-effective, in this way opening it up to new possible uses, generating spaces for
freedom and re-invention. Amplifying “asylum seekers” voices by video-reporting
their personal stories and experiences of dispossession during their “detention” on
rescue vessels blocked by police coast guards helped restore their humanity stripped by
lynching dynamics (La Repubblica, June 25, 2019b). The micro-sabotaging of high-
profile Yellow-Green leaders’ use of political-communicative technologies is a further
example. Namely, anti-homophobic photobombing of the Home Office Secretary or
the exposition on private balconies of banners with the Italian constitutional
chart’s sections on freedom of speech, during Yellow-Green rallies (The
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Guardian, May 11, 2019). These ideas of alternative flash mobs became viral
on social media and traditional media outlets, triggering a wave of micro-
sabotaging actions that impacted on Yellow-Green leaders’ use of social media,
that is, their exploitation of a crucial political technology.
Conclusions
Understanding the Italian Yellow-Green coalition as a techno-sovereignist subject can
help us interpret (and contest) “new” populisms’ features and appeal. These pose
puzzling challenges to progressive politics, offering unprecedented political spaces to
release emotions by lynching “the other” and avenging “the people,” whilst easing their
internal tensions through mythological operations. However, to consider these move-
ments merely as cathartic “spaces” would mean to downplay their distinctively political
nature—lynching dynamics, victimhood rhetoric, networked social media are all
instrumenta regnii, that is, governmental devices.
This article uncovered these dimensions, with respect to the Yellow-Green coalition,
by drawing from public speeches, political programs, and parliamentary proposals, the
political problematics, technologies, and rationalities constituting the Yellow-Green art
of government. In this way, it brought to the fore both the common rationality
engendered by the encounter between a right-wing party and a technocratic movement
(characterized by dichotomisation and lynching dynamics) and the constitutive frictions
emerging from this encounter (regarding, e.g., the concepts of market, immigration, and
environment). The article argued that such tensions were glued together by a “myth-
ological machine” that precariously stabilized the coalition’s identity. Therefore, the
article suggested that if one wants to hinder a subject like the Yellow-Green coalition it
should halt its “mythological machine.”
A key analytical implication of this work is that right-wing populism and techno-
populism appear as reciprocally adaptive political subjects able to articulate a common
(although unstable) political rationality whose features and dynamics may be
reproduced elsewhere by other political assemblages. This means that it is not unlikely
that coalitions similar to the Yellow-Green one could form and lead governments
elsewhere. This also means, from a normative-strategic perspective, that the tactics
sketched out above on how to radicalize the gaps integral to the Yellow-Green
rationality, could turn useful to contest other similar coalitions. Gesture-oriented
political tactics, such as mediatized parrhesia, civil disobedience and micro-media-
sabotaging may be routes to fuel the contradictions at the heart of techno-sovereignism
and to take a step toward alternative forms of coexistence built around social solidarity.
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